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intrOductiOn
Samuel Ramos (1897-1959) is considered one of the 
most important Mexican philosophers of the first half of 
the 20th century. Indeed, in El perfil del hombre y la cul-
tura en México (1934), he articulated and defended the 
thesis that Mexicans are collectively afflicted by an infe-
riority complex which stems from the historical trauma 
of the Spanish conquest. This thesis had a deep impact 
on many subsequent Mexican philosophers (in partic-
ular, on various members of the Hiperión group), who 
subscribed to it in various degrees. However, Ramos’ 
views are not as influential nowadays as they were in the 
1930s and 1940s. Part of the reason for this is that, ac-
cording to some critics of Ramos such as Eugenia Hou-
venaghel (2014a, 2014b), Ramos’ argumentation for his 
claims is logically deficient. Indeed, for Houvenaghel, 
though Ramos stresses in several places of El perfil del 
hombre y la cultura en México that he offers a logical 
demonstration of his central claims (in particular, of the 
Mexican inferiority complex), there are in fact no real 
logical proofs of his central claims and Ramos’ “demon-
strations” are just rhetorical ploys. 
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My paper aims to show that, if we consider the Latin 
American philosophical tradition to which Ramos be-
longs and the US pragmatist philosophical tradition as 
complementary elements of an inclusive philosophical 
community that spans the Americas rather than as sep-
arate strands of thought, we can show that Ramos’ ar-
gumentation for his claims is, pace Houvenaghel, not 
logically deficient but rather an instance of a particular 
type of logical argumentation that is exemplified in the 
US pragmatist tradition. To be more specific, what I aim 
to do in my paper is push back against Houvenaghel by 
examining Ramos’ book through the lens of Peirce’s 
pragmatic maxim (which Peirce considered as a logical 
principle) and argue, that if we interpret Ramos’ claims 
through the pragmatic maxim, his “proofs” are not just 
mere rhetorical ploys but rather bona fide demonstrations 
underpinned by a logical principle. I will proceed in the 
following fashion. After rehearsing briefly in the second 
section of the paper the historical context in which Sam-
uel Ramos lived and which shaped the composition of 
El perfil del hombre y la cultura en México, I will pres-
ent in the third section in more detail the central claims 
that Ramos makes in the book and I will show briefly 
how these claims are articulated within a argumentative 
framework that Ramos intends to be systematic and sub-
ject to the same logical rigor of empirical science. In the 
fourth section, I will introduce in detail the criticisms laid 
down by Houvenaghel vis-à-vis Ramos’ argumentation 
(in particular, the objection that Ramos’ proofs are mere 
rhetorical ploys) and, in the fifth section, I will argue that 
one can push back against these criticisms by examin-
ing Ramos’ book through the lens of Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim. Using both Peirce’s primary works as well as 
the commentary of Hookway (2012), I will argue that, if 
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we interpret Ramos’ work through Peirce’s pragmatism 
by considering both authors as being part of an inclusive 
inter-American philosophical community, we can then 
provide a defense of Ramos’ demonstrations against the 
objections raised by Houvenaghel. Finally, in the sixth 
section, I will offer a brief conclusion. 
 sAmuel rAmOs’ histOricAl cOntext:
mexicO’s PhilOsOPhicAl AtmOsPhere in the 
1920s And 1930s
As I mentioned previously, I want to address in this sec-
tion the historical context in which Ramos lived and 
wrote El Perfil del Hombre y la Cultura en Mexico. Since 
Samuel Ramos was (after some initial studies at the San 
Nicolas College in Michoacan) educated at the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) under the 
mentorship of Antonio Caso, Ramos was influenced by 
many of the philosophical concerns that that his men-
tor addressed. In particular, Caso published in 1924 an 
important book, El Problema de Mexico y la Ideología 
Nacional, in which he argued that the key problem that 
post-revolutionary Mexico faced consisted in the lack 
of racial and social unity (which resulted in a system-
atic underdevelopment). Indeed, insofar as the Mexican 
revolution had torn the country apart for over a decade 
(1910-1921), Mexican politicians and intellectuals in the 
late 1910s and 1920s were particularly concerned with 
creating and implementing effective policies or mecha-
nisms that would unify country and homogenize the dif-
ferent groups that inhabited it. In fact, Vasconcelos’ fa-
mous book La Raza Cósmica (1925) shows also clearly 
a deep concern about the social and racial fractures that 
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underpinned Mexico’s population and articulated a ten-
tative proposal -the program of mestizaje (i.e., race-mix-
ing)- as a way to unify not only Mexico but also Latin 
America against the expansionist and interventionist en-
deavors carried out by successive US governments.
Given this historical and philosophical context, Ra-
mos was also deeply concerned with questions revolving 
around national unity and Mexican identity. However, in 
contrast to his mentor Caso and to Vasconcelos, Ramos 
did not believe that the problems that Mexico faced could 
be addressed by developing group-fusing policies based 
either on forms of racial nationalism (as Vasconcelos ad-
vocated) or on communitarian Christian-inspired ideals 
(as Caso maintained). For Ramos, the approaches artic-
ulated by both Vasconcelos and Caso to the problems 
faced by Mexico were inadequate insofar as both mani-
fested a kind of utopian impulse to create a homogenized 
and unified human collective. In the prologue of the third 
edition, Ramos warns that these approaches are prob-
lematic since “all ideas and political regimes which seek 
to convert man into an animal of the herd, nullifying his 
freedom (…) all these are forces which lead into infra-
humanity” (1962, 13). Instead of these following these 
approaches, Ramos contended that the best way to ad-
dress Mexico’s problems (in particular, its lack of unity 
and its underdevelopment) involved performing initially 
a detailed analysis of the Mexican character and culture 
to uncover the deep roots of these problems. Indeed, for 
Ramos, the lack of unity and underdevelopment are not 
the primary ills that afflict Mexico, but rather the visible 
manifestations or symptoms of a more systemic condi-
tion. In order to uncover this condition, Ramos propos-
es in his book to examine in a systematic fashion the 
character and culture of Mexico through the lens of Al-
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fred Adler’s psychological theories. Following Adler’s 
key suggestion that excessive boasting or affirmation of 
personality is typically a manifestation of an inferiority 
complex, Ramos suggests that, since one of the central 
traits of character of the Mexican character is that “the 
Mexican is full of boasting and believes he demonstrates 
this potency in courage” (1962, 61), it is then adequate 
to use Adler’s psychological theory in order to provide 
an initial analysis (or, rather, diagnosis) of the source of 
Mexico’s problems:
In this essay a methodical application of Adler’s psy-
chological theories to the Mexican is attempted for the 
first time. One must presuppose the existence of an infe-
riority complex in all those people who show an exces-
sive concern with affirming their personality, who take 
vital interest in all situations that signify power, and 
who demonstrate an immoderate eagerness to excel, to 
be the first in everything. Adler states that the inferior-
ity complex appears in a child as soon as he recognizes 
the insignificance of his own strength compared to the 
strength of its parents. Mexico at first found itself in 
the same relationship to the civilized world as that of a 
child to its parents. (1962, 56)
After demarcating himself from his predecessors 
Caso and Vasconcelos and introducing the key method-
ology that he deploys throughout the book in order to 
examine both Mexican character and Mexican culture 
(a methodology that he characterizes as systematic and 
scientific), Ramos then proceeds to deploy the meth-
odology in order to establish or demonstrate a series of 
claims that constitute the central theses of his book. In 
the next section, I will briefly present these claims and 
show briefly how Ramos argues for them. 
156 
 rAmOs’ centrAl clAims in el perfil del hom-
bre y la cultura en mexico
 
The central thesis of the book is undoubtedly the claim 
that the character of Mexicans is shaped by an inferiority 
complex that is manifested in different ways in various 
areas of Mexican culture. In order to support this claim, 
Ramos proceeds in the following fashion. First, he main-
tains that, in order to provide an analysis of the character 
of the Mexican people and of Mexican culture, it is nec-
essary to focus on “the Mexican pelado, for he consti-
tutes the most elements and clearly defined expression 
of national character. (1962, 58). To be more specific, 
Ramos maintains that offering a detailed analysis of the 
attitudes and the psychology of the pelado will provide a 
good window into Mexican culture and institutions to the 
extent that ‘Plato maintained that the state is an enlarged 
image of the individual” (1962, 57). Thus, an analysis of 
the various attitudes and the psychology of the pelado 
will provide, according to him, an appropriate model to 
analyze Mexican culture and institutions. When Ramos 
turns to consider in detail the attitudes of the pelado, he 
remarks that one recurrent feature is a kind of double 
life. Indeed, the pelado exhibits in many circumstances 
aggressiveness and loud boastfulness, but these attitudes 
mask according to Ramos a deep sense of vulnerability 
and inferiority:
He is an animal whose ferocious pantomimes are de-
signed to terrify others, making them believe that he is 
stronger than they and more determined. Such reactions 
are illusory retaliations against his real position in his 
life, which is a nullity. (…) Any exterior circumstance 
that might aggravate his sense of inferiority will pro-
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voke a violent reprisal, the aim of which is to subdue 
his depression. The result is a constant irritability that 
incites him to fight with others on the most insignificant 
pretext. But his bellicose spirit does not derive from a 
sentiment of hostility toward all humanity. The pelado 
seeks quarrels as stimulus, to renew the vigor of his 
downtrodden ego. (1962, 59) 
Thus, for Ramos, the bellicosity and ferocity that 
are displayed by the pelado are just fronts or smoke-
screens that conceal a wounded ego and a state of de-
pression. In virtue of this, Ramos stresses that the central 
trait of character of the pelado is an overcompensated 
inferiority complex. In addition, Ramos also maintains 
that this inferiority complex is intimately related to other 
traits that Mexicans exhibit. In particular, Ramos con-
tends elsewhere in his book that “the most striking aspect 
of Mexican character is distrust”, where distrust is not 
understood as a lack of moral principles, but rather as an 
existential attitude in the sense that it “is not limited to 
the human race; it embraces all that exists and happens” 
(1962, 64). In virtue of this, since the Mexican character 
is dominated according by this visceral distrust vis-à-vis 
everything, one of the consequences that he highlights of 
this is the following:
Thought presupposes that we are capable of expecta-
tion, and one who expects is receptive to the future. 
Obviously, a life without future can have no norms. 
Mexican life is accordingly at the mercy of the four 
winds; instead of sailing, it drifts. (…) With neither dis-
cipline nor organization, Mexican society not unnatu-
rally finds itself in a chaos in which individual beings 
move unpredictably like disperse atoms. (1962, 65) 
158 
As we can appreciate, for Ramos, one of the conse-
quences of the inferiority complex and the distrust of the 
pelado consists in the emergence of social institutions 
that are dysfunctional (e.g., schools that educate hap-
hazardly students or political parties that maintain their 
bases through coercion rather than through persuasion) 
and a culture that, under the veneer of pride, self-aggran-
dizement and boastfulness, conceals a sense of shame, of 
disarray and of vulnerability. Though far more could be 
said about the analysis of Mexican character and culture 
that Ramos presents, I want to limit myself to these core 
observations since I want to turn to the examination that 
Houvenaghel offers of Ramos’ arguments for his claims.
hOuvenAghel’s criticism Of rAmOs:
An illOgicAl ArgumentAtiOn 
In a series of recent papers, Eugenia Houvenaghel (who 
is a literary scholar specializing in the Mexican essay in 
the 20th century) has offered a critical examination of Ra-
mos’ book, focusing on features such as the self-presen-
tation and the general structure that the work displays, 
the argumentative strategies that Ramos employs and 
the logical maxims or inferences that he uses through-
out his book. In particular, Houvenaghel contends that, 
although Ramos aims to write a treatise that is logical, 
systematic, and scientific, the book falls short from his 
ambitions. To show this, Houvenaghel offers an analysis 
of some sections of the book, and she argues the work 
displays some important methodological shortcomings. 
What is of primary concern for me is Houvenghel’s con-
tention that, though Ramos stresses throughout his book 
that his argumentation is logical (i.e., that he relies on 
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certain inferential rules or maxims of reasoning to estab-
lish the claims he makes), he does not really rely on any 
logical principles, which makes his “proofs” or “demon-
strations” a series of rhetorical ploys. In particular, Hou-
venaghel offers as an example of the absence of logical 
argumentation in Ramos’ work the following passage:
There is no reason why the reader should be offended 
by these pages in which the affirmation is not that Mex-
ican is inferior but that he feels inferior. This is quite 
different. (…) If, despite these explanations, the reader 
is hurt, we are sincerely sorry, but we will prove that 
there exists in our countries of America, as Keyserling 
puts it, ‘a propensity to be offended’; thus, an indig-
nant reaction would be the most resounding proof of 
our thesis. (1962, 57) 
 
For Houvenaghel, this passage is particularly 
problematic because, even though Ramos mentions at 
other points in his book inferential rules and reasoning 
principles such as instantiation or deduction, he does not 
visibly employ any of those when he contends that po-
tential offended reactions from Mexican readers would 
provide “proof” of his thesis. In virtue of this, Houve-
naghel writes that “in spite of Ramos’ pretensions and 
of the omnipresence of logic in the vocabulary and the 
style of the passage, it is evident that his argumentation 
is not logical and that his text does not prove anything or 
lead to a necessary conclusion” (2014, 30). In addition, 
Houvenaghel presents also as an example of the absence 
of logic in Ramos’ argumentation the following passage 
where he defends another central claim -namely, that the 
inferiority complex of the Mexican character is not root-
ed in a certain social class, but rather in the very national 
identity:
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To see how nationality in itself creates a feeling of in-
feriority, one need only note the susceptibility of the 
pelado’s patriotic sentiments and his pompous expres-
sion of words and exclamations. The frequency of in-
dividual and collective patriotic manifestation is sym-
bolic of the Mexican’s insecurity about the value of his 
nationality. Decisive proof of the affirmation is found 
in the fact that the same sentiment exists in cultivated 
and intelligent Mexicans of the bourgeoisie (1962, 63). 
 In her analysis of this passage, Houvenaghel 
writes that, since there is no inferential rule or maxim of 
reasoning that Ramos relies on here, “we can conclude 
that there is a tension between the picture that Ramos 
presents on one side of his argumentation through the 
lexicon and the figures of speech he uses, displaying as if 
it was a logical argumentation with demonstrative value, 
and, on the other side, of the likely, probable character 
of his rhetorical argumentation.” (2004, ) In response to 
Houvenghel’s claims, I want to argue that, if we read Ra-
mos as a pragmatist (in particular, if we interpret him as 
relying throughout his book on Peirce’s pragmatic max-
im), one can push back effectively against the criticisms 
that Houvenaghel raises concerning the absence of logic 
in Ramos’ argumentation.
rAmOs As A PrAgmAtist: reAding eL perfiL 
thrOugh Peirce’s PrAgmAtic mAxim
In order to appreciate that Ramos employs Peirce’s prag-
matic maxim in his work (though he does not explicitly 
mention it nor does he make reference to Peirce), let us 
first remind what Peirce maintains in regards to the prag-
matic maxim. Though Peirce offers at different points in 
his writings different characterisations of the pragmatic 
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maxim, one of the first (and most widely recognised) ex-
pressions of the maxim appears in Peirce’s 1878 article 
How to make our ideas clear:
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our con-
ception to have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the object. (W 3, 266) 
As various Peirce scholars have repeatedly point-
ed out, the formulation of the maxim in this passage is 
somewhat vague. How is the maxim to be interpreted? 
What does Peirce mean exactly by “practical bearings”? 
Though I will address this question further down, one 
point that I want to make clear before doing this is that 
Peirce conceives this maxim as a logical principle in the 
following sense: though the pragmatic maxim does not 
express an axiom or an inferential rule that enables us 
to demonstrate certain claims on the basis of others and, 
consequently, is not part of a logic conceived as a calcu-
lus ratiocinator, the maxim is for Peirce a principle that 
enables us to clarify our concepts, to define them with 
an increased precision (or to show that no definition of 
them is possible) and, in virtue of this, it is certainly part 
of a logic conceived as a lingua characteristica univer-
salis, which aims to be able to express and clarify all 
mathematic, scientific and philosophical concepts within 
the framework of a universal language.
Having clarified that the pragmatic maxim is, ac-
cording to Peirce a logical principle in the above men-
tioned sense, I want to turn now to discuss what Peirce 
means by “practical bearings”. In a paper that aims to 
discuss and clarify the content of Peirce’s pragmat-
ic maxim, Christopher Hookway connects the above-
mentioned expression of the maxim with a remark that 
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Peirce makes on a 1907 manuscript. Peirce maintains the 
following in this manuscript:
Intellectual concepts (…) essentially carry some im-
plication concerning the general behaviour either of 
some conscious being or some inanimate object, and 
so convey more, not merely than any feeling, but more, 
too, than any existential fact, namely the ‘would-bes’ 
of habitual behavior; and no agglomeration of actual 
happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of 
a ‘would-be”. But that the total meaning of the predica-
tion of an intellectual conception consists in affirming 
that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given 
kind, the subject of the predication would (or would 
not) behave in a certain way (…) that proposition I take 
to be the kernel of pragmatism. (EP 2: 401-402) 
In virtue of this, Hookway contends (and I agree 
with him) that what Peirce’s pragmatic maxim expresses 
is a mechanism or rule to clarify concepts where “the 
clarification is achieved by providing a list of description 
of the effects we take the object to have; presumably, this 
will involve of how we think the object would behave 
and how we think other objects would behave as a result 
of being affected by the object of the conception” (2012, 
170-171). And, in regard to the ‘practical bearings’, 
what Peirce suggests is that some of effects described 
will have involve implications pertaining to how human 
beings should act. For instance, when Peirce applies the 
pragmatic maxim to the concept of weight, he maintains 
that “to say that a body is heavy means simply that, in 
the absence of any opposing force, it will fall. This (…) 
is evidently the whole conception of weight” (W 3: 267) 
Thus, the application of the pragmatic maxim to the no-
tion of weight shows that, if we want to lift a body from 
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a lower position to a higher one, an opposing force must 
be applied. 
In a similar fashion, I contend that, when Ramos 
suggests that one of the possible reactions of his Mexi-
can readers vis-à-vis his thesis that the Mexican charac-
ter is shaped by an inferiority complex consists in being 
offended, he is employing the pragmatic maxim in the 
sense that he offers a description of how most Mexi-
cans would behave as a result of being exposed to evi-
dence supporting the thesis that the Mexican character is 
shaped by an inferiority complex. For Ramos, being of-
fended (in the case of Mexicans) by his thesis is “proof” 
of it to the extent that the potential reaction provides a 
clarification of the concept of “Mexican inferiority com-
plex” by showing how the concept can, in some circum-
stances, influence the behavior of Mexicans. Moreover, 
when Ramos claims that his thesis that the feeling of 
inferiority of Mexicans is rooted in their nationality is 
“proved” by the fact that the same feeling of inferiority 
is shared by cultivated Mexicans of the bourgeoisie, he 
is employing the pragmatic maxim in the sense that he 
clarifies the concept of “Mexican inferiority complex” 
by showing what effects the concept when it is deployed 
in certain circumstances -in particular, when it is pre-
sented to members of the Mexican bourgeoisie. And, 
in this respect, Ramos stresses that one of the effects of 
the concept is that, when it is used to confront openly 
cultivated Mexicans about their character, they often 
shed the veneer of politeness and become as rude and 
uncouth as the pelado: “Every cultivated Mexican is sus-
ceptible to display, during a fit of anger that makes him 
lose self-control, the tone and the language of the lower 
classes. (…) The Mexican bourgeois has the same patri-
otic susceptibility as the lower classes and same favor-
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able prejudices vis-à-vis the national character” (1972, 
65). In virtue of this, I then conclude that, when Ramos 
maintains that he offers “proofs” of certain claims, he 
is, pace Houvenaghel, not just using rhetoric ploys but 
rather arguing logically insofar as he relies on Peirce’s 
pragmatic maxim.
cOnclusiOn
Let me conclude. I have argued that Ramos employs to 
support some of the claims that he makes in El Perfil 
del Hombre y la Cultura en Mexico Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim and that, in light of this, Houvenaghel’s claim 
that there an absence of logic in Ramos’ argumentation 
is unjustified. Now, if it is indeed the case Ramos em-
ploys Peirce’ pragmatic maxim, this suggests that certain 
currents of thought in classical (North) American phi-
losophy (in particular, pragmatism) and certain currents 
of thought in Latin American philosophy (in particular, 
Mexican philosophy of culture) are not radically distinct, 
but that there are important parallels and commonalities 
between them. Whether these parallels and commonali-
ties are underpinned by a deeper unity is something that 
I intend to explore in future work. 
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